3 different forms, continues to define the working and domestic lives of millions of poor South
Africans. The collection juxtaposes high-profile miners' struggles with longer-term patterns of harm on mines and elsewhere; with the remote and secluded forms of violence that characterise South African agriculture; with contemporary debt and dependency in and beyond work; with the prejudice and systematic marginalisation experienced by non-South African migrants; and with wider-lens analyses of labour history and politics. Together, the articles explore the nexus of labour, violence and insecurity in the round.
In this introduction we map the three central themes that drive the collectionlabour, insecurity and violenceand their interrelation. We consider their significance as central but related tropes in understanding social and economic relations in South Africa, today and in the past. The discussion that follows falls into two halves. First, we explore the violence of labour regimes in South Africa from a broadly historical perspective. Attention to the specificities of labour and violence in South Africa illuminates long-term patterns of coercive incorporation for non-white workers, not least in the iconic setting of the labour compound.
Incorporation into workforces occurred against a backdrop of extraordinarily fragile livelihoods.
While legacies of apartheid's labour landscape persist, the last two decades have seen a waning of the far-reaching control and violent discipline that previously characterised workplaces. As we discuss in the second half of the introduction, South Africa's labour market has come to look more like those of emerging market economies around the world, with the structural violence of extreme inequality looming largest. Existing labour regimes have to be renegotiated, while an increasing number of people are excluded from waged life altogether. Appreciating this, and tracking the orientations of recent scholarly research, means taking a more broadly comparative frame of analysis. Finally, we outline the individual articles, highlighting how each speaks to the themes that animate this special issue.
Introduction submitted for publication in special issue on 'Labour, Insecurity and Violence in South Africa' (M. Bolt and D. Rajak, eds.), Journal of Southern African Studies, provisionally scheduled for October 2016 (42 (5)). 5 for 'bureaucratic offences' (especially pass law infractions). 10 In South Africa, labour conflict and tensions in work hierarchies have also beenand remaindisproportionately likely to lead to physical violence. 11 And work settings have reflected South Africa's broader history of structural and symbolic violence: highly unequal, racialised orders have been strikingly durable, while worker precariousness and vulnerabilitynotorious under apartheidhas deepened in unexpected ways. 12
With such a brutal labour history, it is perhaps unsurprising that Frantz Fanon's analysis of colonial society recurs in the scholarship. For Fanon, racialised violence is central to the system. It is the means for oppressing and debasing the (non-white) colonised, yet the raw coercion of (white) settler societiestheir undisguised viciousnessrenders violence the vehicle both of change and of the reassertion of humanity. 13 Both dehumanising and affirming, therefore, violence has had a particular Fanonian allure, as Breckenridge argues of the gold mines in the first half of the twentieth century. Here, violent masculinities drew on broader gendered norms from black and white workers' rural origins. But the mines were themselves crucibles in which work hierarchy was expressed through the capacity for physical harm. Coercive relations were all-encompassing. In a context that rendered white miners literally 'unbeatable', violence nevertheless offered black workers avenues for selfrespect, whether through physical prowess or the refusal to retaliate. And it produced forms of recognition between white and black workers, and even a degree of intimacy.
Overt violence has thus been socially productive as well as destructive. This is true not only between white workers and managers and black workers, but also among the latter.
Historically, the prevalence of violence within black workforces was built on social and Introduction submitted for publication in special issue on 'Labour, Insecurity and Violence in South Africa' (M. Bolt and D. Rajak, eds.), Journal of Southern African Studies, provisionally scheduled for October 2016 (42 (5)). 6 spatial dislocation in a migrant labour system. But it was about far more than distance from the moral regulation that pertained in rural homes. Mine workforces, in any case, had their imitetotheir own codes of behaviour. 14 Violence also expressed cultural meanings that have persisted over time, offering ways for black men to define themselves under circumstances with few possibilities. 15 Such violence had important organising effects. It was often the result of competition among workers for opportunities, within the parameters set by white management. 16 The famous 'faction fights' of the apartheid era were the result of such struggles, in settings where ethnicity was given a particular reality through management strategies to divide workers, and through migrant associations. 17 Ethnically specific migrant associationslater part of the Whether between black workers, or between them and their white counterparts, the mines represent the quintessentially South African workplace in their everyday brutality, but also the intimacy that came with it. 20 Violence set the terms for respect, self-respect, and defining roles in these total institutions. It organised meanings and hierarchies. The intimacy and organising effects of violence have equally been in evidence on South Africa's farms. In his focus on early-twentieth century sharecropping, Van Onselen shows that violence and protective paternalism were two sides of the same coin. 21 In the countryside, the lack of a lynching culture was in fact the result of white people's trust in the state to uphold a racial order. 26 In any case, employment-related violence was never simply hidden away on farms. In the Transvaal of the first half of the twentieth Introduction submitted for publication in special issue on 'Labour, Insecurity and Violence in South Africa' (M. Bolt and D. Rajak, eds.), Journal of Southern African Studies, provisionally scheduled for October 2016 (42 (5)). 9 century, illegal labour touts and state officials both recruited at gunpoint, the former operating near the northern border, the latter using migrants' lack of legal documentation to supply Eastern Transvaal farms with prison labour. 27 Earlier still, as Gavin Williams reminds us in his article in this issue, the shift from slavery to free labour in the Cape was underpinned by vagrancy laws thatlike in the American South 28cast imprisonment as the alternative to inequitable terms of employment. The dependence and vulnerability of farm dwellers in the Cape were guaranteed by post-slavery Master and Servant Acts and the creation of a large landless rural proletariat, 29 as well as through the payment of wages in wine rations that Williams discusses. At the other end of South Africa, in parts of the northern Transvaal, war and the forcible recruitment of child 'apprentices' had their own dislocating effects. 30 Similarly, the most cloistered labour conditions of allthose of domestic workershistorically relied on a specific legal framework. As Jacklyn Cock describes, the vulnerability, everyday humiliation and extreme exploitation experienced by black women working in white homes were underpinned by exclusion from standard labour law. 31 In a manner comparable to farm workers, they were categorised as within the private realm of the household (and therefore also long covered by Master and Servant legislation). This, in fact, Introduction submitted for publication in special issue on 'Labour, Insecurity and Violence in South Africa' (M. Bolt and D. Rajak, eds.), Journal of Southern African Studies, provisionally scheduled for October 2016 (42 (5)).
10 mirrors agricultural and domestic employment elsewhere. 32 But what gave domestic work in South Africa a particular character was the acute dependence on employers that followed from the pass laws, the far-reaching bureaucratisation of everyday life, and the possibility of being 'endorsed out' of cities. 33 Cultures of violence in turn had far-reaching social effects. Indeed, Kynoch argues that South Africa's exceptionalism was historically not simply a matter of the labour question, as Mamdani famously asserted. Equally exceptional in comparison to other African countries were extraordinary levels of urban violence. This was a story with labour at its heart. Mines were 'incubator[s] for violence', reinforced by a complex that included the prison systemlarge numbers of men circulated through this for statutory offencesas well as humiliation and co-optation by a powerful state. 34 The institutionalisation of violence and ethnicity through gangs was as much a feature of township life as it was of the mines. In both cases, such gangs organised lives and resources in a context of daily insecurity and material deprivation.
After all, if violence requires understanding as something internal to workforce dynamicsas part of the terms of inclusionprecariousness and the possibility of exclusion are equally important. The migrant labour system left workers 'permanently temporary', in an especially stark regional version of a wider pattern. 35 Meanwhile, women's material and spatial dependence on menespecially in urban hostelsleft them intensely vulnerable. 36 Ongoing exposure to harm rendered gangs useful forms of incorporation for the young, and held in place arrangements characterised by extreme inequality, in terms of race and gender. 37 And violent workplace arrangements set the terms of violent performances of masculinity whose effects were felt as far away as rural homes. 38 Violence, overt and structural, was an effect both of state and capitalist arrangements, and of a tenuous foothold in those arrangementsit resulted from the violence of incorporation, and the violence produced at its limits. Today, the significance of viewing South Africa through the lens of labour, insecurity and violence has shifted somewhat.
Workplaces have not disappeared, despite a marked shift in scholarly interests. But the direct control of workers by management, which shaped apartheid-era incorporation into labour arrangements, has receded. On the mines, management withdrew from compounds, leaving authority to migrant associations. 39 Farmers have left paternalism to their senior workers while adopting a corporate style to avoid unwelcome associations with the past. 40 Moreover, far more people are excluded from workplaces altogether, while nevertheless encountering forms of insecurity that are shaped by both abjection and interaction with institutions of state and capital. In the latter case, such interactions are now as often with financial service providers as with employers, with consequences explored by Introduction submitted for publication in special issue on 'Labour, Insecurity and Violence in South Africa' (M. Bolt and D. Rajak, eds.), Journal of Southern African Studies, provisionally scheduled for October 2016 (42 (5)).
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Vally in this issue. 41 The decline of racial Fordism 42 
The violence of insecurity: 'between job and no job' 43
A sense of the 'precarious present' permeates much of current writing on neoliberalism in the Global South, held up as a signifier of a new subjectivity and class position. 44 But while the notion of precariousness has become a buzzword in literature on poverty and marginality, it has lost some of its historical and cultural specificity. The concept of insecurity has received less consideration, confined largely to the nature of employment contracts. This special issue takes its lead from South Africa's labour history, retaining a breadth of approach to insecurity that analyses life conditions and how they are experiencedby those with and without a job.
It also underlines the role of insecurity in producing structural violencethe conditions that render some people more vulnerable to harm than others. 45 Insecurity extends beyond the 14 'if youths fail to get a job by 24, they are unlikely ever to get formal employment'. It cites this as the 'single greatest threat' to social, political and economic security. 49 The areas of job creation are increasingly skills-intensive, leaving a dearth of employment for semi-and unskilled workers, as the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour grew by 10% between 2000 and 2014. 50 One resounding question we are left with then, as Makhulu asks, is how to conceive of human security in the context of a 'wageless life'. 51 However, recent scholarship on both labour and joblessness warns against viewing employment as the simple counterpoint to insecurity. 52 The stark divide between 'job and no job', long entrenched at the heart of both policy and scholarship, has broken down. This is the result of pervasive precariousness, which has become a defining feature of life for those with work as well as those without. Mass job losses in the wake of economic liberalization ushered in by GEAR 53 Matters are more complicated still. As we have discussed, work under apartheid's racial Fordism never guaranteed security for black South Africans under apartheid, even before the advent of liberalization. 55 Nevertheless, within the liberalized economy, this has been exacerbated. Work now seems not even to hold out the possibility of an antidote to Introduction submitted for publication in special issue on 'Labour, Insecurity and Violence in South Africa' (M. Bolt and D. Rajak, eds.), Journal of Southern African Studies, provisionally scheduled for October 2016 (42 (5)). 15 poverty or precariousness. 56 For those in employment, wages too meagre to cover basic needs have failed to offer a palliative to insecurity, in what has come to characterise the 'core' of South Africa's labour market as much as the 'margins'. 57 Barchiesi explains, 'in the expanding middle layer of the "onion" therefore, is a precarious workforce comprising 30 percent of wage earners in casual jobs, "homeworking" or domestic services and a further 20 percent in informal, subsistence, or survival activities'. 58 The massive growth in the use of subcontracting has spread beyond those sectors previously associated with casual labour (such as farm work) to industries once seen as bastions of Fordist industrial labour, such as mining, which by 2008 was taking a third of its labour force from third party contractors. 59 A proliferation of labour brokers and third party contractors accompanied the deregulation of the labour market after 1994. 60 This has been heightened by the fallout out from the financial crisis, and the mass retrenchments that came in its wake. As elsewhere, the connection between 'economic insecurity' and 'vulnerability to political violence' is rendered all the sharper. 62 The South
African Reserve Bank estimates that almost a million jobs have been lost since 2008, 'most of these by black people with low or few technical skills, and little possibility of securing another job'. 63 The constant threat of retrenchment is a potent weapon with which employers can force through ever more flexible working conditions, using third party contractors to create a more 'mobile workforce'. Such job attrition and brokering are amplifications of earlier post-apartheid trends, as already described. In turn, the precaritisation of the workforce serves to manufacture worker consent to declining conditions and repressed wages. 64 The desperation that such perilous conditions engender means that 'poorer black South Africans… are prepared to die for retaining a job… they will be willing to die for less'. 65 However, labour insecurity does not simply correlate with financial crisis. Against the grain of the common narrative, and to borrow the words of a Marikana mineworker: 'you will hear stocks are up but we get nothing'. 66 As Chaskalson points out (this issue), well before highlight the incommensurability between the targets rock drillers must meet, in ever-longer shifts, and the health and safety protocols that companies claim workers must follow in order to ensure their safety. 68 Responsibility for ensuring safety at an unstable rock face is personalised; blame for inevitable accidents is individualised as failure to follow guidelines.
Recent scholarship also highlights the psycho-social turmoil of precarious lives lived under great pressure. 69 Workers have been robbed not only of an adequate living wage to sustain a household, but also of the sense of personhood, sodality, value, and citizenship tied to employment, replaced with the 'lingering feeling of being disposable'. 70 
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physical insecurities of everyday life and the kinds of survivalism they demand, there is an existential insecurity that comes from radical uncertainty about the future. 71 For those who work and live in contexts of industrial capitalism (such as mines, plants, agribusinesses and free trade zones) this foreclosure of hope in future mobility is perhaps even more pointed as it runs counter to 'capitalism's own temporal registers of progress'. 72 The gap between expectation and reality is particularly potent for workers in post-apartheid South Africa. Here, high hopes on the back of the liberation struggle (and the great strength of the unions in overthrowing apartheid) have generated an even greater sense of frustration, disappointment and betrayal when 'the economically liberating stable employment most South African's aspire to' failed to materialize. 73 The sense of abandonment among workers, especially amidst occupational hazards, comes through in a number of the articles in this special issue.
Both intense material precariousness and accompanying psychic turmoil may be inflected by the sense that chronic transition has become a permanent state of affairs. 74 This produces a metaphysical insecurity as moral and ethical certainties collapse and 'norms formerly taken for granted cease to produce intended effects'. 75 Perhaps one of the strongest expressions of this has been seen in the sense of nostalgia for the brutal yet predictable certainties of the apartheid workscape, and even for a powerful state, noted by anthropologists over the past decade. 76 2016 (42 (5) ). 20 game of snakes and ladders, on which the ladders are clustered at the top and the snakes at the bottom. 80 It is always easier to slip down that it is to climb up.
Insecurity is therefore not simply a feature of the degradation of work within a precarious labour market. It is equally tied to new cultures of consumption and credit, closely bound up with aspirations of mobility and the desire to realise the long-awaited fruits of economic freedom. 81 James notes that the growing crisis in personal debt (doubling since 1994) has not primarily been among 'the unemployed or the poorest of the poor' (as it is widely assumed to be), but rather among 'salary and wage earners in the middle of the scale… where stable pay packets are subjected to less-than-stable pressures'. 82 The result is that even those with a secure income face new levels of financial insecurity. 83 Meanwhile the promotion of 'Bottom of the Pyramid' credit services -'banking the unbanked'appears to offer a way of coping with precarious or uncertain incomes. But rather than creating empowered and upwardly mobile financial citizens, it compounds existing insecurity through indebtedness. 84 With easy credit extended by corporate banks and store cards, the National Credit Regulator has estimated that nearly half of all consumers are three months or more behind on their payments. 85 If much of this is familiar from other settings, South Africa departs from the stock narrative of 'neoliberal' social insecurity and economic precariousness among the working poor in important ways. These trends have been accompanied by an unprecedented extension rather than withdrawal of state social assistanceagainst the grain of structural adjustment and more recent austerity measures. This huge programme of social grants complicates any This distinctively South African story faces challenges that are familiar from elsewhere. The provision of social support is contested by a strong normative discourse that valorises work. Increasingly, the emphasis is now on entrepreneurialism and microenterprise. Both are peddled by donor and state agencies alike, not just to the jobless but also to those in wage labour, glossing survivalism as resourcefulness and precariousness as opportunity. As Prentice argues, the precaritization of work is reconfigured as an opportunity for 'empowerment' and self-actualization, in which the precariat are 'free to author their own destinies while negating the histories of struggle that have made this framing possible'. 87 Drawing on powerful ideals of choice and freedom, a discourse of self-sufficiency leaves the majority with the experiences of insecurity already discussed.
However, such discourses have limited reach. South Africa's history of extreme inequality, shaped by state and corporate domination, is also a history of challenge from below. In the post-apartheid era, this is manifest in thousands of public provision protests escalating across the country over the past decade (the Institute of Social Security estimates at Introduction submitted for publication in special issue on 'Labour, Insecurity and Violence in South Africa' (M. Bolt and D. Rajak, eds.), Journal of Southern African Studies, provisionally scheduled for October 2016 (42 (5)).
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least five per day 88 ). 'Unstoppable yet apparently unlinkable', 89 argue Bond and Mottiar, they have amounted to a new tide of popular struggle and claim-making that represented the routine, low-profile seeds of Marikana. 90 Indeed, the sometimes-violent insurgency of South Africa's citizens may hold out new political possibilities, with their potency most clearly revealed by the brutality of state response. 91 For the violent order depicted by Fanon, with which this introduction began, has not disappeared. As von Holdt notes, contrasting Fanon with Bourdieu is useful for making sense of continuity in South Africa since the 1980s. Fanon imagines a settler-society status quo upheld by undisguised brutality, which is also an order whose hold is not absolute. Bourdieu imagines European societies in which people are pacified and arrangements sustained by the symbolic violence of naturalised hierarchy. In South Africa, what has pertained is somewhere between the two. Symbolic orders, today and at least since the protests of late apartheid, are distinctly fragile. Little in the status quo is simply taken for granted. In workforces and in protest settings more generally, physical violence creates spaces for alternative orders with their own rules. Yet, argues von Holdt, we may be watching a more sedimented order in the making. In the process, the physical and structural violence underpinning it are laid bare.
Meanwhile, anti-state or anti-capitalist physical violence is revealed not just as liberatory, but also as open to manipulation by elites and as holding the potential to reinforce an emerging unequal order. 92 The powerful-but-not-so-powerful infrastructure of state and capital continues to make South Africa distinctive, in the southern African region and beyond. It creates its own 'crisis of masculinity'. 95 The limited and multiple incorporations of workforce and workplace indeed forms of worker self-understanding that resisted pacificationare replaced by ever more desperate 'declarations of dependence'. 96 If these 'declarations' have become key to attempts to avoid exposure to destitution, Situated within this broader concern with structural violence and everyday coercion, a 
